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Abstract: Changes in the U.S. peanut program have resulted in drastically decreased planted 
acres and forced many peanut producers in the Southwest to consider alternative crops.  This 
study examined the economic risk associated with producing peanuts and common alternatives to 
peanuts.  Seedless watermelon is an alternative for risk preferring farmers whereas, irrigated 
peanut is the best choice for risk averse farmers. 
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Peanuts are an important cash generating traditional crop in Oklahoma.  Peanuts rank 7
th 
in value among Oklahoma agricultural commodities and Oklahoma ranks 6
th among peanut 
producing states with 4.63 percent of US peanut Production (Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics, 
2003). 
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of May 2002 (2002 Farm Bill) brought 
about historic changes in the US approach to regulating peanut markets.  Before 2002, peanuts 
had been among a small group of US commodities regulated by marketing quotas.  The quota 
system was established during the great depression to support and stabilize growers’ incomes 
through supply limitation and price supports (Dohlman et al.). 
Under the quota system, supply controls assured peanut quota holders of receiving high 
support prices.  Those quota peanuts could be sold for the domestic food use market.  Peanuts 
produced beyond the quota limits could be sold at a lower price to the crush market or could be 
exported.  Non-quota peanuts were called “additionals”.  Producers who were quota owners had 
the right to rent their quotas.  Under the 1996 Farm Bill, these quota peanuts were priced up to 
$610 per ton.  Producers who did not have quota rights were assured only $132 per ton in 
2001/2002 (Chvosta et al., 2003). 
The 2002 Farm Bill terminated this supply limiting marketing quota system for peanuts.  
The new peanut policy implied that all peanut producers, whether quota holders or non-quota 
holders are eligible for the same kinds of government payments that are available for the 
mainstream commodity crops such as grains, cotton and oilseeds.  The 2002 Farm Bill includes   3
three provisions for peanut growers: direct fixed payments, counter cyclical payments and 
marketing assistance loans. 
US peanut growers are a small but geographically concentrated group of farmers.  Due to 
the crop’s soil and climatic requirements, peanuts are produced only in 9 states.  These states fall 
in one of three regions: The Southeast (Georgia, Alabama, Florida and South Carolina), the 
Southwest (Texas, Oklahoma and New Mexico) and Mid-Atlantic (Virginia and North Carolina). 
The passage of the 2002 Farm Bill eliminated the support price policy and peanut prices 
are as low as half the support price prior to the 2002 Farm Bill.  Due to the fall in price, these 
peanut growing areas experienced large declines in the acreage.  According to the USDA, 
National Agricultural Statistical Service data base, after the 2002 Farm Bill, US peanut planted 
acreage declined 12 percent from 2001 to 1.36 million acres and was the smallest since 1982.  
The decline in planted acres in the year 2003, compared with year 2001, was steep in Virginia 
(55 percent), Oklahoma (54 percent) and Texas (35 percent). 
Oklahoma peanut planted acres dramatically dropped in the 2003 planting season to the 
lowest level since 1928.  The drop in planted acres caused reduced production and hence the 
value of production.  Oklahoma peanut production decreased to 98 million pounds in 2003 from 
198 million pounds in 2001, more than a 50 percent decrease in production.  Similarly, the value 
of production decreased to 18.7 million dollars in 2003 from 54.2 million dollars in 2001, more 
than a 65 percent decrease.       
Oklahoma peanut production is not as profitable as it was prior to the 2002 Farm Bill.  
The change forced many Oklahoma farmers to abandon peanut production and look for 
alternative crops.  Many farmers have expressed an interest in switching to alternative 
enterprises.  However, due to inadequate knowledge about the future consequences of the new   4
alternatives, farmers are having difficulty in crop choice decisions.  At this time it is very 
important to carefully examine the profitability of peanuts relative to alternatives.  The overall 
objective of this research endeavor is to increase the ability of Southwestern Oklahoma peanut 
producers to make more informed decisions related to changes in the farm operations.  The 
specific objective is to determine risk efficient crop alternatives to peanuts in Southwestern 
Oklahoma.  
 
Historical Overview of U.S. Peanut Policy 
 
Most of the U.S. commodity programs originated with the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1933 (Dohlman et al.).  The peanut program was in effect when peanuts were designated as a 
basic commodity in 1934.  Under this Act, peanut producers were mandated payments in return 
for taking land out of production.  In 1937, the Regional Grower’s Association was formed.  It 
purchased specified quantities of peanuts from registered participants at support prices set by the 
government.  However, this program was unsuccessful because it could not sustain high prices 
and non-participant growers expanded acreage planted to peanuts (Rucker and Thurman). 
Failure of this voluntary acreage reduction led to the establishment of a mandatory 
program in 1941.  Individual acreage allotments were set and penalties were applied to those 
who would produce on additional lands.  However, during World War II, these penalties were 
not applied.  As a result the U.S. peanut acreage increased to 3.4 million acres during the 1943-
48 period, up from 1.9 million acres in 1941 (Chvosta et al., 2003). 
After World War II, the Agricultural Act of 1949 established support prices for peanuts 
between 75 to 90 percent of the then current levels.  Payments of support prices were made only 
if acreage allotments and marketing quotas were approved by peanut growers.  Periodical   5
approval of such allotments and quotas were made and this program was in effect until 1978.  
During this period new peanut varieties were introduced and new production technologies were 
employed which led to increases in per-acre yield.  The rate of growth of production was higher 
than the rate of growth of consumption.  Thus, government purchases and the treasury costs of 
the peanut program increased substantially (Chvosta et al., 2001). Due to the large program costs 
in the 1970s, the peanut program was amended by the Food and Agricultural Act of 1977.  
According to this new program (1978-81), producers received the support prices only on quota 
peanuts and this time the quota was set annually in poundage terms to meet the market demand 
(Borges). 
In 1982, the acreage allotment was abandoned.  Under this new program anyone could 
grow peanuts but only those growers who had poundage quotas would receive the edible support 
price.  During 1986-90 program periods, one of the most noticeable changes was in the 
distribution of profits from association pools.  Previously separate quota pools and additional 
pools were merged and profits from additional pools were used to offset losses from quota pools 
(Rucker and Thurman). 
The 1990 Farm Act legislated a minimum national poundage quota and support price 
escalator that raised the peanut loan rate based on estimated increases in production cost.  The 
loan rate for quota peanuts was set at $ 678 per ton and the national minimum quota was set at 
1.35 million tons.  The peanut program came under substantial pressure after the approval of 
NAFTA and GATT.  The peanut program was blamed for creating barriers to trade and unfairly 
protecting peanut producers from international competition.  This pressure led to the Federal 
Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (Chvosta et al., 2003).   6
The 1996 FAIR Act made some important adjustment in the previous Act.  Basic feature 
of the 1996 FAIR Act is planting flexibility.  Support price was reduced by 10 percent to $610 
per ton from $678 per ton.  This was the first instance that the nominal price of peanuts was 
lowered in the history of the U.S. peanut program.  The annual effective quota was reduced from 
1.47 million tons for the 1995 crop year to 1.15 million tons for the 1996 crop year.  The 2002 
Farm Bill terminated the existing supply limiting marketing quota system and replaced it with 
marketing assistance loan program.  All farmers are eligible for the loan rate for the current 
production regardless of whether or not they qualify as historic peanut producers under previous 
programs. 
 
Policy Change and its Impact on Peanut Producers 
 
Farm policy programs have changed substantially from their origins.  The basic direction 
of change has been a shift from annual acreage supply controls, combined with price supports 
above market clearing levels, to less supply intervention and more direct income support (Pease 
et al.).  Chvosta et al., 2003 have shown that in the aggregate U.S. farmers would lose $712 per 
farm per year under the 2002 Farm Bill if they continue to grow peanuts. They further estimated 
that Oklahoma quota peanut producers would lose $4,759 per farm per year which is the highest 
among other peanut producing states. 
Pease et al. have reported that the 2002 Farm Bill has substantially decreased the annual 
net returns of the Virginia peanut producers.  Their estimate shows that under the 2002 Farm Bill 
peanut enterprise would barely cover its variable cost of production.  Smith and Bullen showed 
that there is net increase in farm income for Georgia and North Carolina farms under the 2002   7
Farm Bill compared with the FAIR Act of 1996.  The Increase in the net return is due to 
government payments.     
To summarize the existing literatures, there are mixed results.  Therefore, it is very 
difficult to generalize the results over wider spatial extent.  Which makes it necessary to focus on 
a particular area to infer the situation of that particular area.  One important thing to notice is 
that, all of these analyses are based on the average estimates.  Since crop production is a risky 
business we have to take into account the risk associated with it.  
 
Methodology 
    Typical enterprise budgets for peanuts, cotton, soybeans and watermelons that are 
specific to Caddo County, Oklahoma are constructed to generate net returns.  Two budgets are 
prepared for peanuts, cotton and soybeans; one for dry land and one for irrigated conditions.  
Two budgets are also prepared for watermelons; one for seedless watermelons and one for 
seeded watermelons.  Both seeded and seedless watermelons are grown under irrigated 
conditions.  This provides eight enterprise budgets as alternatives to determine the most 
profitable enterprise and to rank the associated risk of each alternative.  Average farm acres in 
our model are fixed at 310 acres per farm because Caddo County has an average farm size of 310 
acres according to the 2002 Census of Agriculture.  The budgets assume no economies of size. 
  State level average annual producer price of cotton and soybeans for a period of 10 years 
(1995-2004) were obtained from the National Agriculture Statistics Service of the United States 
Department of Agriculture (NASS/USDA).  However, the peanut price from 1995-2004 cannot 
be used because of the changes in the price support program mandated by the 2002 Farm Bill.  
Therefore, weekly national market price for peanuts from 2002 (September) to 2004 (December)   8
was obtained from the Farm Service Agency (FSA) of USDA.  These weekly prices were 
converted into average annual prices using simple averages.  FSA reports different prices for 
four different types of peanuts.  This study utilizes the price of the runners since more than 70 
percent of the total peanuts produced in Caddo County are runners. 
  Seedless and seeded watermelon prices were obtained from the Dallas Terminal Market 
reported by USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS/USDA).  These prices are wholesale 
prices.  Producer received prices are extrapolated from Dallas terminal wholesale price data 
assuming transportation and packaging cost margins of 30 percent.  However, the actual margin 
will vary by an unknown amount depending upon the supply and demand situation in the Dallas 
terminal market (Wathen et al.). 
Irrigated and non-irrigated yield of peanuts and cotton for Caddo County were obtained 
from NASS/USDA.  There is no separate yield of soybeans for irrigated and non-irrigated 
condition reported for Caddo County or even the state of Oklahoma.  Therefore, the irrigated and 
non-irrigated yield of soybeans from Northern High Plain region of Texas is used assuming that 
this yield closely resembles Southwestern Oklahoma yields.  The Northern High Plains region of 
Texas is geographically close to Southwestern Oklahoma. 
Watermelon yield for both seeded and seedless variety is obtained from Wes Watkins 
Agricultural Research and Extension Center, Lane, Oklahoma.  According to the information 
provided by the Lane Agriculture Center scientists, yield for both the seedless and seeded 
watermelon can be assumed to be the same when irrigated.  But the producer received price for 
these two types of watermelons can be different. 
Peanuts, cotton and soybeans are program crops and the farmers growing these crops will 
receive payments from the government.  Payments are made based on the base acres established   9
on the farm during the crop year 2002.  Base acres cannot exceed the farm’s cropland acreage.  
Once the farmers enroll in the payment program, they are eligible for the payment through the 
policy period (2002-2007) even though they did not grow that crop in a particular year.  Farmers 
can still receive payments although they choose to grow different crop in the peanut base.  
However, the crop alternative should be a program crop or pasture.  Watermelons are non 
program crops. 
There are three types of payments implemented by the 2002 Farm Bill: the Direct Fixed 
Payments (DP), Counter Cyclical Payments (CCP) and Loan Deficiency Payment (LDP).  There 
were no LDPs in 2003 and 2004 as the market price exceeded the loan rate.  Therefore, we 
assume LDPs to be zero while preparing budgets.  DP for peanut base is calculated as: 
(1)  *** 0 . 8 5 DP DPR PY BA =  
where DPR is the direct payment rate that is constant ($36/ton) and established by the 2002 Farm 
Bill.  PY is payment yield and BA is base acres.  PY is determined by FSA.    PY for Caddo 
County was set to be 3210 pounds per acre through the policy period (2002-2007).  Base acre 
may vary greatly among different farmers.  However, our budget model assumes it to be 310 
acres.  CCP is calculated as: 
(2)  { max(Pr, )}* * *0.85 CCP TP DPR MLR PY BA =− −  
where TP is the target price established by the 2002 Farm Bill ($495/ton), DPR is the direct 
payment rate as in equation (1).  Max (Pr, MLR) is either market prices (Pr) or the Marketing 
Assistance Loan Rate (MLR) whichever is higher.  MLR is set to be $355 per ton by the 2002 
Farm Bill.  PY and BA are payment yield and base acres respectively as in equation (1).  The 
number 0.85 in equation (1) and (2) indicate that only 85 percent of the base acres are eligible for 
the government payments.   10
  Costs associated with producing peanuts, cotton, soybeans and watermelons were 
obtained from different several sources including Oklahoma State University fact sheets, OSU 
budgets software and the cucurbit manual published by Lane Agriculture Center.  These costs are 
representative of average costs for farms in Caddo County.  Larger and smaller farms may have 
lower or higher costs per acre.  All of the machinery costs are based on custom hired machines 
(Doye et al.) and the irrigation estimates are based on central pivot sprinkler system. 
Net returns are calculated for each crop alternative as: 
(3)      NR i = (P i * Y i) - (VC i + FC i) + DP i +CCP i 
 
where: 
NRi  is the net returns for i
th alternative. 
P i is the price of i
th commodity 
Y i is the yield of i
th commodity 
VC i is the variable cost of i
th commodity 
FC i is the fixed cost of i
th commodity 
 DP i is the direct fixed payment for i
th commodity 
CCP i is the counter cyclical payment for i
th commodity 
  Stochastic simulation is defined as a tool for addressing “what if…” questions about a 
real economic system in a non-destructive manner (Richardson, 2005).  Net return for each crop 
production alternative is considered as the key output variable.  To simulate net returns one or 
more of the input variables of the model (exogenous variables) should be considered stochastic.  
Our study considers average annual crop yield, price received by farmers and the custom 
machinery rates as stochastic.  We used a GRKS distribution to simulate these variables.  Gray, 
Richardson, Klose and Schumann developed the GRKS distribution to simulate subjective   11
probability distributions based on minimal input data.  Parameters used for GRKS distributions 
are minimum, mean and maximum of the stochastic variables. 
  Enterprise budgets that include one or more stochastic variables are called stochastic 
budgets.  Net returns estimated from these budgets are simulated for 200 iterations generating 
200 possible net returns for each crop production alternative.  Simulation was done using the 
SIMETAR© simulation package developed by Richardson, Schumann and Feldman in the 
Department of Agricultural Economics at Texas A&M University.  These iterated net returns are 
used in stochastic efficiency analysis to rank the preferred production alternatives. 
  Risk efficient crop production alternatives were identified using Stochastic Efficiency 
with Respect to a Function (SERF) criteria for a range of risk attitudes.  SERF analysis relies on 
the assumption that decision makers have an expected utility function, U(x), which is increasing 
and twice differentiable with respect to x.  SERF uses a range of Risk Aversion Coefficients 
(RACs).  SERF involves comparison of cumulative probability distributions of simulated net 
returns for each crop alternative. 
  SERF analysis is done assuming a negative exponential utility function for which 
Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient (ARAC) range is set to be -0.1 and +0.1.  SERF uses 
Certainty Equivalents (CE) to rank risky alternatives.  Certainty equivalent value shows the 
amount of money that the decision maker would have to be paid to be indifferent between the 
particular scenario and a no risk investment.  We also estimated confidence premiums for each 
alternative.  Confidence premium indicates how much a decision maker has to be paid to switch 
from the preferred strategy. 
  RAC where the preference changes is called Break Even Risk Aversion Coefficient 
(McCarl 1988).   The BRAC method was used to identify risk preference intervals reflecting   12
unique preference rankings.  BRAC for each pair of risky alternatives is identified.  Richardson, 
Schumann and Feldmann suggest that BRACs are the same as the RACs where the CE line 
crosses in the SERF chart.  Using McCarls BRAC procedure we can calculate the actual range of 
RACs where one alternative is preferred and the range over which another alternative is 
preferred. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Our analysis starts with the interpretation of the average net returns generated from the 
deterministic enterprise budgets.  The mean analysis indicates that growing seedless watermelon 
is the most profitable alternative with the net returns of $ 893.87 per acre followed by seeded 
watermelon ($ 674.39 per acre) and irrigated peanuts ($ 288.98 per acre) respectively (Table 1).  
Despite the change in the commodity program policy by the 2002 Farm Bill, irrigated peanuts 
are still more profitable compared to other program crops like cotton and soybeans.  Direct fixed 
payments and counter cyclical payments for peanut base were estimated to be $49.11 per acre 
and $133.24 per acre respectively.   
Government payments have significant contribution to net farm income.  For farmers 
growing irrigated peanuts, the government payment constitutes 63 percent of the net return.  
Highest percentage net return from government payment is for dry land cotton, 183 percent.  
DCP payments, average net returns and percent contribution of government payment to net 
return is shown in Table 1.  Note that watermelons are not included in the government program 
crops and farmers will gain no government payments for growing watermelons. 
Simulated net returns provide us the opportunity to conduct the risk efficiency analysis.  
Mean simulated net returns were found to be the highest for seedless watermelon ($ 1353.66 per   13
acre) followed by seeded watermelons ($853.47 per acre) and irrigated peanuts ($ 276.34 per 
acre) respectively.  However, the standard deviation for seedless watermelon was found to be the 
highest (1835.95) followed by seeded watermelon (899.96) and irrigated cotton (106.586) (Table 
2). 
Stochastic efficiency analysis utilizes simulated net returns distribution to rank crop 
production alternatives in terms of Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient (ARAC).  Preferences 
ranking of different crop alternatives under different ARAC are shown in Table 3.  Each column 
in the table shows the range of upper and lower risk aversion coefficient within which the 
preference prevails.  Seedless watermelon production is ranked first in the risk aversion 
coefficient as high as 0.000613.  The ARAC can be interpreted as the percentage change in 
marginal utility per unit change in the net revenue.  The change in the marginal utility can be 
positive, zero or negative based on the risk averse, risk neutral or risk preferring nature of the 
farmers respectively. 
The seedless watermelon production dropped rapidly in the rankings as the ARAC 
increased, suggesting that a rough knowledge of risk preferences may be of significant 
importance in identifying preferred production alternatives.  Seedless watermelon production can 
be worse case for the farmers having ARAC higher than 0.002280.  Preference ranking based on 
generalized stochastic dominance indicate that irrigated peanuts can be stable alternative and is 
ranked high throughout the range of the ARAC. 
Confidence Premium (CP) results are shown in Table 4-6 assuming ARAC of 
-0.01 for risk preferring farmer (Table 4), -0.0001 to 0.0001 for risk neutral farmer (Table 5) and 
0.01 for risk averse farmer (Table 6).  CP indicates the relative conviction that a farmer has to a 
particular alternative ranking.       14
The result shows that the risk preferring farmer will have to be paid $ 5390.13 per acre to 
accept seeded watermelon production (second best) over seedless watermelon (best alternative).  
Similarly, risk preferring farmer will have to be paid $8305.07 per acre to accept irrigated peanut 
production (third best) over seedless watermelon (best alternative).  Risk neutral farmer has to be 
paid $ 640.92 per acre to accept seeded watermelon production and he has to be paid $1259.27 
per acre to accept irrigated peanuts production over seedless watermelon.     
However, irrigated peanuts production is the best alternative and seedless watermelon 
production is the worst for a risk averse farmer with ARAC of 0.01.  He has to be paid $ 73.99 
per acre to accept dry land soybean production (second best) over irrigated peanuts.  However, 
the risk averse farmer has to be paid as high as $ 2349.27 per acre to accept seedless watermelon 
(worse) over irrigated peanut production.  This finding shows the importance of risk analysis for 
making crop production choices for crops with highly variable net returns. 
 Pair wise comparison of simulated cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of eight 
crop production alternatives are also provided in Table 7.  There are two possible outcomes: 
either one alternative dominates the other or dominance can not be determined.  If one crop 
alternative dominate the other through the entire range of given ARACs, then either alternative 
in the column dominates alternative in the row (CDR) or alternative in the row dominates 
alternative in the column (RDC).  However, if the CDFs have an intersection then either column 
dominates row (BRAC with asterisk) or the row dominates column (BRAC without asterisk) 
above that intersection.  BRAC is the ARAC at which risk preference changes between a pair of 
production choices.  In other word, each BRAC is a reference point that separates the farmers by 
their risk attitudes. 
   15
Conclusion 
This study examined the economic risks associated with producing peanuts and common 
alternatives to peanuts in Southwestern Oklahoma.  A total of eight different enterprises were 
generated for analysis.  Enterprise budgets were made stochastic to provide more information.  
Results indicate that seedless watermelon production is a highly probable alternative to irrigated 
peanuts if producers are willing to accept the risk associated with the perishable nature of the 
horticultural crops.  The seedless watermelon production dropped rapidly in the rankings as the 
ARAC increased, suggesting that the rough knowledge of the risk attitude has significant 
importance in identifying preference ranking.  Preference rankings indicated that the irrigated 
peanut production is a highly viable choice for risk averse farmers. 
Government payments play a significant roll in the sustainability of the farms in 
Southwestern Okalahoma.  Only irrigated peanuts and dry land soybeans were found to be 
profitable without including government payments.  This study only considered eight 
alternatives.  Further research can utilize several other alternatives to determine the profitability 
and risk associated with them.  Another research focus could be to determine different 
management strategies such as use of different levels of inputs, time of planting, use of own 
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Table1: DCP Payments, Net Returns and Percent Contribution of Government 
Payment on Net Returns for Crop Alternatives in Caddo County using Baseline 
Costs and Prices 
 




Mean Net Return 
($/Acre) 
Percent Net Return from 
Government Payment 
Irrigated Peanuts  182.35 288.98  63.10 
Dry land Peanuts  182.35 148.51  122.77 
Irrigated Cotton  182.35 122.61  148.72 
Dry land Cotton  182.35 99.52  183.23 
Irrigated Soybeans  182.35 166.84  109.29 
Dry land Soybeans  182.35 205.80  88.60 
Seedless 
Watermelon 
0.00 893.87  0.00 
Seeded Watermelon  0.00 674.39  0.00 
Note: watermelons are not program crops and are not eligible for government payment  
1DCP Payments  = Sum of Direct fixed payment and counter cyclical payments.   19
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Simulated Average Net Returns generated from 
Stochastic Budgets ($/Acre) 
 
Commodity  Mean  Std.    Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Irrigated Peanuts  276.34 35.006 174.53 358.20 
Dry Land Peanuts  133.24 84.920 -107.75  325.92 
Irrigated Cotton  120.90 106.586 -130.77 404.47 
Dry land Cotton  105.45 53.346  2.08  291.69 
Irrigated Soybeans  168.99 37.319  85.83  279.10 
Dry land Soybeans  200.93 31.723 120.74 296.26 
Seedless Watermelon  1353.66 1835.954 -2602.86 9117.04 
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Table 3: Preference Rankings of Crop Production Alternatives in terms of Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient 
 
  Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient 
Lower  -0.1000 -0.0704 -0.0428 -0.0320 -0.0154 -0.0152 -0.0094 -0.0051 0.000614 0.001105 0.001216 0.001265 
Upper  -0.0705 -0.0429 -0.0320 -0.0154 -0.0153 -0.0094 -0.0052 0.000613 0.001104 0.001215 0.001264 0.001324 
Ranking 
PNI  4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 
PND  5 5 5 6 6 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 
CNI  3 3 4 4 5 5 6 7 7 7 7 7 
CND  7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
SBI  8 7 7 7 7 6 5 5 5 5 5 4 
SBD  6 6 6 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 
WMS  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 5 
WMD  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 
 
  Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient 
Lower  0.0001324 0.001347 0.001361 0.002281 0.002770 0.002998 0.003343 0.003494 0.003502  0.003734  0.01042 
Upper  0.001346 0.001360  0.002280 0.002769 0.002997 0.003342 0.003493  0.003501 0.003733  0.010410  0.10000 
Ranking 
PNI  2  2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1  1  1 
PND  5  5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4  4  5 
CNI  7  6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5  6  6 
CND  8  8 7 7 7 7 7 7 6  5  4 
SBI  4  4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3  3  3 
SBD  3  3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2  2  2 
WMS  6  7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8  8  8 
WMD  1  1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  7  7 
 
Where, PNI = Irrigated Peanuts, PND = Dry land Peanuts, CNI =  Irrigated Cotton, CND= Dry land Cotton,  
SBI = Irrigated Soybeans, SBD = Dry Land Soybeans, WMS = Seedless Watermelon, WMD = Seeded Watermelon. 
   21
Table 4: Confidence Premium ($/Acre) for Risk Preferring Farmer with -0.01 ARAC 
 
  WMS  WMD  PNI SBD CNI SBI PND 
WMS  -        
WMD  5390.13  -      
PNI  8305.07  2914.94  -     
SBD  8381.23  2991.10  76.16  -    
CNI  8407.94 3017.80  102.86  26.71  -     
SBI  8410.91 3020.78  105.84  29.68  2.97  -   
PND  8421.36  3031.23  116.29  40.13 13.43 10.45  - 
CND  8465.15  3075.02  160.08  83.92 57.21 54.24 43.79 
Note: Crops in the column are dominant over crops in the row.   22
Table 5: Confidence Premium ($/Acre) for Risk Neutral Farmer with -0.0001 to 0.0001 
ARAC 
 
  WMS  WMD  PNI SBD SBI PND CNI 
WMS  -        
WMD  640.92  -      
PNI  1259.27  618.35  -     
SBD  1334.69  693.77  75.42  -    
SBI  1336.61 725.69  107.34  31.92  -     
PND  1402.08 761.16  142.81  67.39  35.47  -   
CNI  1412.21  773.29  154.94  79.52 47.60 12.13  - 
CND  1430.09  789.17  170.82  95.39 63.47 28.01 15.87 
Note: Crops in the column are dominant over crops in the row.   23
Table 6: Confidence Premium ($/Acre) for Risk Averse Farmer with 0.01 ARAC 
 
  PNI SBD SBI PND  CND CNI  WMD 
PNI  -        
SBD  73.99  -      
SBI  107.54  33.55  -     
PND  175.35  101.36  67.81  -    
CND  176.80 102.81  69.26  1.45  -     
CNI  200.35  126.36  92.81 25.00 23.55  -   
WMD  647.11 573.12 539.56 471.75 470.31 446.76  - 
WMS  2349.03 2275.04 2241.49 2173.68 2172.23 2148.68 1701.93 
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Table 7: Break Even Risk Aversion Coefficient from Pair-wise Comparison of Crop Production Choices 
 
 
PNI PND  CNI CND  SBI  SBD  WMS 
PNI           
PND  CDR            
CNI  -0.0428 -0.0051           
CND  CDR 0.01042*  0.003734*         
SBI  CDR -0.0152*  -0.0094*  -0.0704*       
SBD  CDR -0.0320*  -0.0154*  RDC  RDC     
WMS  0.001105 0.001324 0.001347  0.00136  0.00127  0.001216   
WMD  0.002281 0.003343 0.003494  0.00350  0.00299  0.002770 0.00061* 
CDR = alternative in the column dominates alternative in the row 
RDC = alternative in the row dominates alternative in the column 
* indicates that row alternative dominates column alternative above this BRAC 
BRAC without * indicate that column alternative dominate row alternative above this BRAC 